Pearson's correlation is one of the most common measures of linear dependence. Recently, Bernardo (11th International Workshop on Objective Bayes Methodology, 2015) introduced a flexible class of priors to study this measure in a Bayesian setting. For this large class of priors, we show that the (marginal) posterior for Pearson's correlation coefficient and all of the posterior moments are analytic. Our results are available in the open-source software package JASP.

Bayesian hypothesis testing presents an attractive alternative to p value hypothesis testing. Part I of this series outlined several advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing, including the ability to quantify evidence and the ability to monitor and update this evidence as data come in, without the need to know the intention with which the data were collected. Despite these and other practical advantages, Bayesian hypothesis tests are still reported relatively rarely. An important impediment to the widespread adoption of Bayesian tests is arguably the lack of user-friendly software for the run-of-the-mill statistical problems that confront psychologists for the analysis of almost every experiment: the t-test, ANOVA, correlation, regression, and contingency tables. In Part II of this series we introduce JASP ( http://www.jasp-stats.org ), an open-source, cross-platform, user-friendly graphical software package that allows users to carry out Bayesian hypothesis tests for standard statistical problems. JASP is based in part on the Bayesian analyses implemented in Morey and Rouder's BayesFactor package for R. Armed with JASP, the practical advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing are only a mouse click away.

Animal research and computational modeling have indicated an important role for the neuromodulatory locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system in the control of behavior. According to the adaptive gain theory, the LC-NE system is critical for optimizing behavioral performance by regulating the balance between exploitative and exploratory control states. However, crucial direct empirical tests of this theory in human subjects have been lacking. We used a pharmacological manipulation of the LC-NE system to test predictions of this theory in humans. In a double-blind parallel-groups design (N = 52), participants received 4 mg reboxetine (a selective norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor), 30 mg citalopram (a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor), or placebo. The adaptive gain theory predicted that the increased tonic NE levels induced by reboxetine would promote task disengagement and exploratory behavior. We assessed the effects of reboxetine on performance in two cognitive tasks designed to examine task (dis)engagement and exploitative versus exploratory behavior: a diminishing-utility task and a gambling task with a non-stationary pay-off structure. In contrast to predictions of the adaptive gain theory, we did not find differences in task (dis)engagement or exploratory behavior between the three experimental groups, despite demonstrable effects of the two drugs on non-specific central and autonomic nervous system parameters. Our findings suggest that the LC-NE system may not be involved in the regulation of the exploration-exploitation trade-off in humans, at least not within the context of a single task. It remains to be examined whether the LC-NE system is involved in random exploration exceeding the current task context.

In a series of four experiments, Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) found support for the conjecture that clockwise movements induce psychological states of temporal progression and an orientation toward the future and novelty. Here we report the results of a preregistered replication attempt of Experiment 2 from Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012). Participants turned kitchen rolls either clockwise or counterclockwise while answering items from a questionnaire assessing openness to experience. Data from 102 participants showed that the effect went slightly in the direction opposite to that predicted by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), and a preregistered Bayes factor hypothesis test revealed that the data were 10.76 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. Our findings illustrate the theoretical importance and practical advantages of preregistered Bayes factor replication studies, both for psychological science and for empirical work in general.

Bayesian parameter estimation and Bayesian hypothesis testing present attractive alternatives to classical inference using confidence intervals and p values. In part I of this series we outline ten prominent advantages of the Bayesian approach. Many of these advantages translate to concrete opportunities for pragmatic researchers. For instance, Bayesian hypothesis testing allows researchers to quantify evidence and monitor its progression as data come in, without needing to know the intention with which the data were collected. We end by countering several objections to Bayesian hypothesis testing. Part II of this series discusses JASP, a free and open source software program that makes it easy to conduct Bayesian estimation and testing for a range of popular statistical scenarios (Wagenmakers et al. this issue).

Many psychologists do not realize that exploratory use of the popular multiway analysis of variance harbors a multiple-comparison problem. In the case of two factors, three separate null hypotheses are subject to test (i.e., two main effects and one interaction). Consequently, the probability of at least one Type I error (if all null hypotheses are true) is 14 % rather than 5 %, if the three tests are independent. We explain the multiple-comparison problem and demonstrate that researchers almost never correct for it. To mitigate the problem, we describe four remedies: the omnibus F test, control of the familywise error rate, control of the false discovery rate, and preregistration of the hypotheses.

We describe a general method that allows experimenters to quantify the evidence from the data of a direct replication attempt given data already acquired from an original study. These so-called replication Bayes factors are a reconceptualization of the ones introduced by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(4), 1457-1475 2014) for the common t test. This reconceptualization is computationally simpler and generalizes easily to most common experimental designs for which Bayes factors are available.

Gautret and colleagues reported the results of a non-randomised case series which examined the effects of hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin on viral load in the upper respiratory tract of Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) patients. The authors reported that hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) had significant virus reducing effects, and that dual treatment of both HCQ and azithromycin further enhanced virus reduction. In light of criticisms regarding how patients were excluded from analyses, we reanalysed the original data to interrogate the main claims of the paper. We applied Bayesian statistics to assess the robustness of the original paper's claims by testing four variants of the data: 1) The original data; 2) Data including patients who deteriorated; 3) Data including patients who deteriorated with exclusion of untested patients in the comparison group; 4) Data that includes patients who deteriorated with the assumption that untested patients were negative. To ask if HCQ monotherapy was effective, we performed an A/B test for a model which assumes a positive effect, compared to a model of no effect. We found that the statistical evidence was highly sensitive to these data variants. Statistical evidence for the positive effect model ranged from strong for the original data (BF+0 ~11), to moderate when including patients who deteriorated (BF+0 ~4.35), to anecdotal when excluding untested patients (BF+0 ~2), and to anecdotal negative evidence if untested patients were assumed positive (BF+0 ~0.6). The fact that the patient inclusions and exclusions are not well justified nor adequately reported raises substantial uncertainty about the interpretation of the evidence obtained from the original paper.