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On page 1 showing 1 ~ 8 papers out of 8 papers

Tissue tropisms opt for transmissible reassortants during avian and swine influenza A virus co-infection in swine.

  • Xiaojian Zhang‎ et al.
  • PLoS pathogens‎
  • 2018‎

Genetic reassortment between influenza A viruses (IAVs) facilitate emergence of pandemic strains, and swine are proposed as a "mixing vessel" for generating reassortants of avian and mammalian IAVs that could be of risk to mammals, including humans. However, how a transmissible reassortant emerges in swine are not well understood. Genomic analyses of 571 isolates recovered from nasal wash samples and respiratory tract tissues of a group of co-housed pigs (influenza-seronegative, avian H1N1 IAV-infected, and swine H3N2 IAV-infected pigs) identified 30 distinct genotypes of reassortants. Viruses recovered from lower respiratory tract tissues had the largest genomic diversity, and those recovered from turbinates and nasal wash fluids had the least. Reassortants from lower respiratory tracts had the largest variations in growth kinetics in respiratory tract epithelial cells, and the cold temperature in swine nasal cells seemed to select the type of reassortant viruses shed by the pigs. One reassortant in nasal wash samples was consistently identified in upper, middle, and lower respiratory tract tissues, and it was confirmed to be transmitted efficiently between pigs. Study findings suggest that, during mixed infections of avian and swine IAVs, genetic reassortments are likely to occur in the lower respiratory track, and tissue tropism is an important factor selecting for a transmissible reassortant.


SARS-CoV-2 Exposure in Norway Rats (Rattus norvegicus) from New York City.

  • Yang Wang‎ et al.
  • mBio‎
  • 2023‎

Millions of Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) inhabit New York City (NYC), presenting the potential for transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from humans to rats. We evaluated SARS-CoV-2 exposure among 79 rats captured from NYC during the fall of 2021. Our results showed that 13 of the 79 rats (16.5%) tested IgG- or IgM-positive, and partial SARS-CoV-2 genomes were recovered from all 4 rats that were qRT-PCR (reverse transcription-quantitative PCR)-positive. Genomic analyses suggest these viruses were associated with genetic lineage B, which was predominant in NYC in the spring of 2020 during the early pandemic period. To further investigate rat susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 variants, we conducted a virus challenge study and showed that Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants can cause infections in wild-type Sprague Dawley (SD) rats, including high replication levels in the upper and lower respiratory tracts and induction of both innate and adaptive immune responses. Additionally, the Delta variant resulted in the highest infectivity. In summary, our results indicate that rats are susceptible to infection with Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants, and wild Norway rats in the NYC municipal sewer systems have been exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Our findings highlight the need for further monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 in urban rat populations and for evaluating the potential risk of secondary zoonotic transmission from these rat populations back to humans. IMPORTANCE The host tropism expansion of SARS-CoV-2 raises concern for the potential risk of reverse-zoonotic transmission of emerging variants into rodent species, including wild rat species. In this study, we present both genetic and serological evidence for SARS-CoV-2 exposure to the New York City wild rat population, and these viruses may be linked to the viruses that were circulating during the early stages of the pandemic. We also demonstrated that rats are susceptible to additional variants (i.e., Alpha, Delta, and Omicron) that have been predominant in humans and that susceptibility to infection varies by variant. Our findings highlight the reverse zoonosis of SARS-CoV-2 to urban rats and the need for further monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 in rat populations for potential secondary zoonotic transmission to humans.


SARS-CoV-2 exposure in Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) from New York City.

  • Yang Wang‎ et al.
  • bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology‎
  • 2022‎

Millions of Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) inhabit New York City (NYC), presenting the potential for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to rats and other wildlife. We evaluated SARS-CoV-2 exposure among 79 rats captured from NYC during the fall of 2021. Results showed that 13 of 79 rats (16.5%) tested IgG or IgM positive, and partial genomes of SARS-CoV-2 were recovered from four rats that were qRT-PCR positive. Using a virus challenge study, we also showed that Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants can cause robust infections in wild-type Sprague Dawley (SD) rats, including high level replications in the upper and lower respiratory tracts and induction of both innate and adaptive immune responses. Additionally, the Delta variant resulted in the highest infectivity. In summary, our results indicated that rats are susceptible to infection with Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants, and rats in the NYC municipal sewer systems have been exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Our findings highlight the potential risk of secondary zoonotic transmission from urban rats and the need for further monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 in those populations.


Evolutionary pathway for the 2017 emergence of a novel highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus among domestic poultry in Tennessee, United States.

  • Lei Li‎ et al.
  • Virology‎
  • 2018‎

In March 2017, a novel highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus was detected at two commercial broiler breeder facilities in Tennessee, United States. In this study, a wild bird low pathogenic avian influenza A virus, A/blue-winged teal/Wyoming/AH0099021/2016(H7N9), was shown to be the probable precursor of the novel H7N9 virus; this low pathogenic virus has eight possible progenitor genes sharing > 99% sequence identity with the novel H7N9 virus. Phylogeographic analyses showed that viral gene constellations that formed and circulated among dabbling ducks contributed to the emergence of the novel H7N9 virus. This is in contrast to the virus that caused the 2016 H7N8 outbreak, which had more genetic contributions from viruses circulating among diving ducks. Study findings support the need for ongoing wild bird surveillance to monitor circulating viruses and to understand possible evolutionary pathways of virus emergence in poultry.


Limited Antigenic Diversity in Contemporary H7 Avian-Origin Influenza A Viruses from North America.

  • Yifei Xu‎ et al.
  • Scientific reports‎
  • 2016‎

Subtype H7 avian-origin influenza A viruses (AIVs) have caused at least 500 confirmed human infections since 2003 and culling of >75 million birds in recent years. Here we antigenically and genetically characterized 93 AIV isolates from North America (85 from migratory waterfowl [1976-2010], 7 from domestic poultry [1971-2012], and 1 from a seal [1980]). The hemagglutinin gene of these H7 viruses are separated from those from Eurasia. Gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions was observed in the hemagglutinin of H7 AIVs from waterfowl and domestic poultry. Genotype characterization suggested that H7 AIVs in wild birds form diverse and transient internal gene constellations. Serologic analyses showed that the 93 isolates cross-reacted with each other to different extents. Antigenic cartography showed that the average antigenic distance among them was 1.14 units (standard deviation [SD], 0.57 unit) and that antigenic diversity among the H7 isolates we tested was limited. Our results suggest that the continuous genetic evolution has not led to significant antigenic diversity for H7 AIVs from North America. These findings add to our understanding of the natural history of IAVs and will inform public health decision-making regarding the threat these viruses pose to humans and poultry.


An Opportunistic Survey Reveals an Unexpected Coronavirus Diversity Hotspot in North America.

  • Hon S Ip‎ et al.
  • Viruses‎
  • 2021‎

In summer 2020, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was detected on mink farms in Utah. An interagency One Health response was initiated to assess the extent of the outbreak and included sampling animals from on or near affected mink farms and testing them for SARS-CoV-2 and non-SARS coronaviruses. Among the 365 animals sampled, including domestic cats, mink, rodents, raccoons, and skunks, 261 (72%) of the animals harbored at least one coronavirus. Among the samples that could be further characterized, 127 alphacoronaviruses and 88 betacoronaviruses (including 74 detections of SARS-CoV-2 in mink) were identified. Moreover, at least 10% (n = 27) of the coronavirus-positive animals were found to be co-infected with more than one coronavirus. Our findings indicate an unexpectedly high prevalence of coronavirus among the domestic and wild free-roaming animals tested on mink farms. These results raise the possibility that mink farms could be potential hot spots for future trans-species viral spillover and the emergence of new pandemic coronaviruses.


Accelerated evolution of SARS-CoV-2 in free-ranging white-tailed deer.

  • Dillon S McBride‎ et al.
  • Nature communications‎
  • 2023‎

The zoonotic origin of the COVID-19 pandemic virus highlights the need to fill the vast gaps in our knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 ecology and evolution in non-human hosts. Here, we detected that SARS-CoV-2 was introduced from humans into white-tailed deer more than 30 times in Ohio, USA during November 2021-March 2022. Subsequently, deer-to-deer transmission persisted for 2-8 months, disseminating across hundreds of kilometers. Newly developed Bayesian phylogenetic methods quantified how SARS-CoV-2 evolution is not only three-times faster in white-tailed deer compared to the rate observed in humans but also driven by different mutational biases and selection pressures. The long-term effect of this accelerated evolutionary rate remains to be seen as no critical phenotypic changes were observed in our animal models using white-tailed deer origin viruses. Still, SARS-CoV-2 has transmitted in white-tailed deer populations for a relatively short duration, and the risk of future changes may have serious consequences for humans and livestock.


Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in free-ranging white-tailed deer in the United States.

  • Aijing Feng‎ et al.
  • Nature communications‎
  • 2023‎

SARS-CoV-2 is a zoonotic virus with documented bi-directional transmission between people and animals. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to free-ranging white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) poses a unique public health risk due to the potential for reservoir establishment where variants may persist and evolve. We collected 8,830 respiratory samples from free-ranging white-tailed deer across Washington, D.C. and 26 states in the United States between November 2021 and April 2022. We obtained 391 sequences and identified 34 Pango lineages including the Alpha, Gamma, Delta, and Omicron variants. Evolutionary analyses showed these white-tailed deer viruses originated from at least 109 independent spillovers from humans, which resulted in 39 cases of subsequent local deer-to-deer transmission and three cases of potential spillover from white-tailed deer back to humans. Viruses repeatedly adapted to white-tailed deer with recurring amino acid substitutions across spike and other proteins. Overall, our findings suggest that multiple SARS-CoV-2 lineages were introduced, became enzootic, and co-circulated in white-tailed deer.


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