The volume of genomics and health data is growing rapidly, driven by sequencing for both research and clinical use. However, under current practices, the data is fragmented into many distinct datasets, and researchers must go through a separate application process for each dataset. This is time-consuming both for the researchers and the data stewards, and it reduces the velocity of research and new discoveries that could improve human health. We propose to simplify this process, by introducing a standard Library Card that identifies and authenticates researchers across all participating datasets. Each researcher would only need to apply once to establish their bona fides as a qualified researcher, and could then use the Library Card to access a wide range of datasets that use a compatible data access policy and authentication protocol.

The availability of human genomic data, together with the enhanced capacity to process them, is leading to transformative technological advances in biomedical science and engineering. However, the public dissemination of such data has been difficult due to privacy concerns. Specifically, it has been shown that the presence of a human subject in a case group can be inferred from the shared summary statistics of the group, e.g. the allele frequencies, or even the presence/absence of genetic variants (e.g. shared by the Beacon project) in the group. These methods rely on the availability of the target's genome, i.e. the DNA profile of a target human subject, and thus are often referred to as the membership inference method.

The outsourcing of genomic data into public cloud computing settings raises concerns over privacy and security. Significant advancements in secure computation methods have emerged over the past several years, but such techniques need to be rigorously evaluated for their ability to support the analysis of human genomic data in an efficient and cost-effective manner. With respect to public cloud environments, there are concerns about the inadvertent exposure of human genomic data to unauthorized users. In analyses involving multiple institutions, there is additional concern about data being used beyond agreed research scope and being prcoessed in untrused computational environments, which may not satisfy institutional policies. To systematically investigate these issues, the NIH-funded National Center for Biomedical Computing iDASH (integrating Data for Analysis, 'anonymization' and SHaring) hosted the second Critical Assessment of Data Privacy and Protection competition to assess the capacity of cryptographic technologies for protecting computation over human genomes in the cloud and promoting cross-institutional collaboration. Data scientists were challenged to design and engineer practical algorithms for secure outsourcing of genome computation tasks in working software, whereby analyses are performed only on encrypted data. They were also challenged to develop approaches to enable secure collaboration on data from genomic studies generated by multiple organizations (e.g., medical centers) to jointly compute aggregate statistics without sharing individual-level records. The results of the competition indicated that secure computation techniques can enable comparative analysis of human genomes, but greater efficiency (in terms of compute time and memory utilization) are needed before they are sufficiently practical for real world environments.

No abstract available

The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) created the Beacon Project as a means of testing the willingness of data holders to share genetic data in the simplest technical context-a query for the presence of a specified nucleotide at a given position within a chromosome. Each participating site (or "beacon") is responsible for assuring that genomic data are exposed through the Beacon service only with the permission of the individual to whom the data pertains and in accordance with the GA4GH policy and standards.While recognizing the inference risks associated with large-scale data aggregation, and the fact that some beacons contain sensitive phenotypic associations that increase privacy risk, the GA4GH adjudged the risk of re-identification based on the binary yes/no allele-presence query responses as acceptable. However, recent work demonstrated that, given a beacon with specific characteristics (including relatively small sample size and an adversary who possesses an individual's whole genome sequence), the individual's membership in a beacon can be inferred through repeated queries for variants present in the individual's genome.In this paper, we propose three practical strategies for reducing re-identification risks in beacons. The first two strategies manipulate the beacon such that the presence of rare alleles is obscured; the third strategy budgets the number of accesses per user for each individual genome. Using a beacon containing data from the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrate that the proposed strategies can effectively reduce re-identification risk in beacon-like datasets.