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To facilitate rapid detection of a future bioterrorist attack, an increasing number of public health departments are investing in new surveillance systems that target the early manifestations of bioterrorism-related disease. Whether this approach is likely to detect an epidemic sooner than reporting by alert clinicians remains unknown. The detection of a bioterrorism-related epidemic will depend on population characteristics, availability and use of health services, the nature of an attack, epidemiologic features of individual diseases, surveillance methods, and the capacity of health departments to respond to alerts. Predicting how these factors will combine in a bioterrorism attack may be impossible. Nevertheless, understanding their likely effect on epidemic detection should help define the usefulness of syndromic surveillance and identify approaches to increasing the likelihood that clinicians recognize and report an epidemic.
The global events of the last two decades indicate that the threat of biological warfare is not a myth, but a harsh reality. The successive outbreaks caused by newly recognized and resurgent pathogens and the risk that high-consequence pathogens might be used as bioterrorism agents amply demonstrate the need to enhance capacity in clinical and public health management of highly infectious diseases. This review article provides a concise overview of bioterrorism, the agents used, and measures to counteract it, with a relevant note on India's current scenario of surveillance systems, laboratory response network, and the need for preparedness.
While newly available electronic transmission methods can increase timeliness and completeness of infectious disease reports, limitations of this technology may unintentionally compromise detection of, and response to, bioterrorism and other outbreaks. We reviewed implementation experiences for five electronic laboratory systems and identified problems with data transmission, sensitivity, specificity, and user interpretation. The results suggest a need for backup transmission methods, validation, standards, preserving human judgment in the process, and provider and end-user involvement. As illustrated, challenges encountered in deployment of existing electronic laboratory reporting systems could guide further refinement and advances in infectious disease surveillance.
In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facilities, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty (91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law enforcement communities.
Global terrorism is a rapidly growing threat to world security, and increases the risk of bioterrorism. In this Review, we discuss the potential threat of bioterrorism, agents that could be exploited, and recent developments in technologies and policy for detecting and controlling epidemics that have been initiated intentionally. The local and international response to infectious disease epidemics, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome and west African Ebola virus epidemic, revealed serious shortcomings which bioterrorists might exploit when intentionally initiating an epidemic. Development of new vaccines and antimicrobial therapies remains a priority, including the need to expedite clinical trials using new methodologies. Better means to protect health-care workers operating in dangerous environments are also needed, particularly in areas with poor infrastructure. New and improved approaches should be developed for surveillance, early detection, response, effective isolation of patients, control of the movement of potentially infected people, and risk communication. Access to dangerous pathogens should be appropriately regulated, without reducing progress in the development of countermeasures. We conclude that preparedness for intentional outbreaks has the important added value of strengthening preparedness for natural epidemics, and vice versa.
The 2001 anthrax mail attacks in the United States demonstrated the potential threat of bioterrorism, hence driving the need to develop sophisticated treatment and diagnostic protocols to counter biological warfare. Here, by performing flux balance analyses on the fully-annotated metabolic networks of multiple, whole genome-sequenced bacterial strains, we have identified a large number of metabolic enzymes as potential drug targets for each of the three Category A-designated bioterrorism agents including Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis and Yersinia pestis. Nine metabolic enzymes- belonging to the coenzyme A, folate, phosphatidyl-ethanolamine and nucleic acid pathways common to all strains across the three distinct genera were identified as targets. Antimicrobial agents against some of these enzymes are available. Thus, a combination of cross species-specific antibiotics and common antimicrobials against shared targets may represent a useful combinatorial therapeutic approach against all Category A bioterrorism agents.
The limited circulation of many of the agents that are likely to be used in a bioterrorism attack precludes the ready availability of positive controls. This means that only specialized laboratories can screen for the presence of these agents by nucleic amplification assays. Calibrated controls are also necessary for quantitative measurements. Primers and probes to be used in both conventional and real-time PCR assays were designed for the detection of agents likely to be used by a bioterrorist. Three plasmids, each of which contains 4 to 6 specific sequences from agents on the CDC Category A and B list (excluding RNA viruses) were constructed. Two plasmids incorporate the sequences of Category A and B agents, respectively. The third plasmid incorporates sequences from Variola major and organisms that cause rash-like illnesses that may be clinically confused with smallpox. An "exogenic sequence", introducing a NotI restriction site was incorporated in the native sequences of the bioterrorism agents inserted in plasmids. The designed molecular system for detection of bioterrorism agents was tested on each of these agents (except Monkeypox virus, Smallpox virus and 2 Burkholderia species for which no native DNA was available) and a collection of 50 isolates of C. burnetii using constructed plasmids as positive controls.
Molecular subtyping of Bacillus anthracis played an important role in differentiating and identifying strains during the 2001 bioterrorism-associated outbreak. Because B. anthracis has a low level of genetic variability, only a few subtyping methods, with varying reliability, exist. We initially used multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) to subtype 135 B. anthracis isolates associated with the outbreak. All isolates were determined to be of genotype 62, the same as the Ames strain used in laboratories. We sequenced the protective antigen gene (pagA) from 42 representative outbreak isolates and determined they all had a pagA sequence indistinguishable from the Ames strain (PA genotype I). MLVA and pagA sequencing were also used on DNA from clinical specimens, making subtyping B. anthracis possible without an isolate. Use of high-resolution molecular subtyping determined that all outbreak isolates were indistinguishable by the methods used and probably originated from a single source. In addition, subtyping rapidly identified laboratory contaminants and nonoutbreak-related isolates.
The potential use of biological agents has become a major public health concern worldwide. According to the CDC classification, Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, the bacterial pathogens that cause anthrax and botulism, respectively, are considered to be the most dangerous potential biological agents. Currently, there is no licensed vaccine that is well suited for mass immunization in the event of an anthrax or botulism epidemic. In the present study, we developed a dual-expression system-based multipathogen DNA vaccine that encodes the PA-D4 gene of B. anthracis and the HCt gene of C. botulinum. When the multipathogen DNA vaccine was administered to mice and guinea pigs, high level antibody responses were elicited against both PA-D4 and HCt. Analysis of the serum IgG subtype implied a combined Th1/Th2 response to both antigens, but one that was Th2 skewed. In addition, immunization with the multipathogen DNA vaccine induced effective neutralizing antibody activity against both PA-D4 and HCt. Finally, the protection efficiency of the multipathogen DNA vaccine was determined by sequential challenge with 10 LD50 of B. anthracis spores and 10 LD50 of botulinum toxin, or vice versa, and the multipathogen DNA vaccine provided higher than 50% protection against lethal challenge with both high-risk biothreat agents. Our studies suggest the strategy used for this anthrax-botulinum multipathogen DNA vaccine as a prospective approach for developing emergency vaccines that can be immediately distributed on a massive scale in response to a biothreat emergency or infectious disease outbreak. Key points • A novel multipathogen DNA vaccine was constructed against anthrax and botulism. • Robust immune responses were induced following vaccination. • Suggests a potential vaccine development strategy against biothreat agents.
This review discusses the utilization of wild or domestic animals as surveillance tools for monitoring naturally occurring environmental and human health hazards. Besides providing early warning to natural hazards, animals can also provide early warning to societal hazards like bioterrorism. Animals are ideal surveillance tools to humans because they share the same environment as humans and spend more time outdoors than humans, increasing their exposure risk. Furthermore, the biologically compressed lifespans of some animals may allow them to develop clinical signs more rapidly after exposure to specific pathogens. Animals are an excellent channel for monitoring novel and known pathogens with outbreak potential given that more than 60 % of emerging infectious diseases in humans originate as zoonoses. This review attempts to highlight animal illnesses, deaths, biomarkers or sentinel events, to remind human and veterinary public health programs that animal health can be used to discover, monitor or predict environmental health hazards, human health hazards, or bioterrorism. Lastly, we hope that this review will encourage the implementation of animals as a surveillance tool by clinicians, veterinarians, ecosystem health professionals, researchers and governments.
The advent of domestic bioterrorism has emphasized the need for enhanced detection of clusters of acute illness. We describe a monitoring system operational in eastern Massachusetts, based on diagnoses obtained from electronic records of ambulatory-care encounters. Within 24 hours, ambulatory and telephone encounters recording patients with diagnoses of interest are identified and merged into major syndrome groups. Counts of new episodes of illness, rates calculated from health insurance records, and estimates of the probability of observing at least this number of new episodes are reported for syndrome surveillance. Census tracts with unusually large counts are identified by comparing observed with expected syndrome frequencies. During 1996-1999, weekly counts of new cases of lower respiratory syndrome were highly correlated with weekly hospital admissions. This system complements emergency room- and hospital-based surveillance by adding the capacity to rapidly identify clusters of illness, including potential bioterrorism events.
Modern threats of bioterrorism force the need for multiple detection of biothreat agents to determine the presence or absence of such agents in suspicious samples. Here, we present a rapid electrochemical fiveplex biochip screening assay for detection of the bioterrorism relevant low molecular weight toxins saxitoxin, microcystin-LR, T-2 toxin, roridin A and aflatoxin B1 relying on anti-idiotypic antibodies as epitope-mimicking reagents. The proposed method avoids the use of potentially harmful toxin-protein conjugates usually mandatory for competitive immunoassays. The biochip is processed and analyzed on the automated and portable detection platform pBDi within 13.4 min. The fiveplex biochip assay revealed toxin group specificity to multiple congeners. Limits of detection were 1.2 ng/mL, 1.5 ng/mL, 0.4 ng/mL, 0.5 ng/mL and 0.6 ng/mL for saxitoxin, microcystin-LR, T-2 toxin, roridin A or aflatoxin B1, respectively. The robustness of the fiveplex biochip for real samples was demonstrated by detecting saxitoxin, microcystin-LR, HT-2 toxin, roridin A and aflatoxin B1 in contaminated human blood serum without elaborate sample preparation. Recovery rates were between 52-115% covering a wide concentration range. Thus, the developed robust fiveplex biochip assay can be used on-site to quickly detect one or multiple low molecular weight toxins in a single run.
The use of biological agents has generally been confined to military-led conflicts. However, there has been an increase in non-state-based terrorism, including the use of asymmetric warfare, such as biological agents in the past few decades. Thus, it is becoming increasingly important to consider strategies for preventing and preparing for attacks by insurgents, such as the development of pre- and post-exposure medical countermeasures. There are a wide range of prophylactics and treatments being investigated to combat the effects of biological agents. These include antibiotics (for both conventional and unconventional use), antibodies, anti-virals, immunomodulators, nucleic acids (analogues, antisense, ribozymes and DNAzymes), bacteriophage therapy and micro-encapsulation. While vaccines are commercially available for the prevention of anthrax, cholera, plague, Q fever and smallpox, there are no licensed vaccines available for use in the case of botulinum toxins, viral encephalitis, melioidosis or ricin. Antibiotics are still recommended as the mainstay treatment following exposure to anthrax, plague, Q fever and melioidosis. Anti-toxin therapy and anti-virals may be used in the case of botulinum toxins or smallpox respectively. However, supportive care is the only, or mainstay, post-exposure treatment for cholera, viral encephalitis and ricin - a recommendation that has not changed in decades. Indeed, with the difficulty that antibiotic resistance poses, the development and further evaluation of techniques and atypical pharmaceuticals are fundamental to the development of prophylaxis and post-exposure treatment options. The aim of this review is to present an update on prophylaxis and post-exposure treatment recommendations and research initiatives for biological agents in the open literature from 2007 to 2009.
Preterm delivery causes substantial neonatal mortality and morbidity. Unrecognized intra-amniotic infections caused by cultivation-resistant microbes may play a role. Molecular methods can detect, characterize and quantify microbes independently of traditional culture techniques. However, molecular studies that define the diversity and abundance of microbes invading the amniotic cavity, and evaluate their clinical significance within a causal framework, are lacking.
The threat of bioterrorism and the potential use of biological weapons against both military and civilian populations has become a major concern for governments around the world. For example, in 2001 anthrax-tainted letters resulted in several deaths, caused widespread public panic and exerted a heavy economic toll. If such a small-scale act of bioterrorism could have such a huge impact, then the effects of a large-scale attack would be catastrophic. This review covers recent progress in developing therapeutic countermeasures against, and diagnostics for, such agents.
Plague, in the Middle Ages known as Black Death, continues to occur at permanent foci in many countries, in Africa, Asia, South America, and even the USA. During the last years outbreaks were reported from at least 3 geographical areas, in all cases after tens of years without reported cases. The recent human plague outbreaks in Libya and Algeria suggest that climatic and other environmental changes in Northern Africa may be favourable for Y. pestis epidemiologic cycle. If so, other Northern Africa countries with plague foci also may be at risk for outbreaks in the near future. It is important to remember that the danger of plague reoccurrence is not limited to the known natural foci, for example, those of Algeria, Angola, and Madagascar. In a general context, it is important that governments know the dangerous impact that this disease may have and that the health and medical community be familiar with the epidemiology, symptoms, treatment, and control of plague, so an appropriated and timely response can be delivered should the worst case happen. Plague can be used as a potential agent of bioterrorism. We have concluded that plague is without a doubt a reemerging infectious disease.
In a bioterrorism event, a tool is needed to rapidly differentiate Bacillus anthracis from other closely related spore-forming Bacillus species. During the recent outbreak of bioterrorism-associated anthrax, we sequenced the 16S rRNA generom these species to evaluate the potential of 16S rRNA gene sequencing as a diagnostic tool. We found eight distinct 16S types among all 107 16S rRNA gene seqs fuences that differed from each other at 1 to 8 positions (0.06% to 0.5%). All 86 B. anthracis had an identical 16S gene sequence, designated type 6; 16S type 10 was seen in all B. thuringiensis strains; six other 16S types were found among the 10 B. cereus strains. This report describes the first demonstration of an exclusive association of a distinct 16S sequence with B. anthracis. Consequently, we were able to rapidly identify suspected isolates and to detect the B. anthracis 16S rRNA gene directly from culture-negative clinical specimens from seven patients with laboratory-confirmed anthrax.
Autophagy has been shown recently to play an important role in the intracellular survival of several pathogenic bacteria. In this study, we investigated the effect of a novel small-molecule autophagy-inducing agent, AR-12, on the survival of Francisella tularensis, the causative bacterium of tularemia in humans and a potential bioterrorism agent, in macrophages.
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